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Reconstructing Cumis:
What the California Legislature Got Wrong
About California Civil Code Section 286o
and How to Fix It
RICH MAROTrI*
INTRODUCTION
In 1984, California courts leapt to the forefront of protecting
consumers of insurance with the decision in San Diego Navy Federal
Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.' The opinion was one of
the first in the country to deal extensively with the conflicts that can arise
when insurance companies select defense attorneys for their insureds.
Several years later, the California General Assembly enacted California
Civil Code section 2860. The statute was presumably established in
response to the expansive Cumis decision. However, the bill containing
the language that ultimately became section 286o received little to no
public comment, nor does it appear to have received much scrutiny from
the assembly. It amounted to a backroom deal among special interest
groups that was revealed only a few days before it was submitted to the
governor. The suspicious origins of the bill make it questionable whether
strong consideration was given to the underlying thought in Cumis.
As a result, section 2860 distorts the problem and solution identified
in Cumis and California courts are, accordingly, constrained from fixing
the problem as originally envisioned in Cumis. This Note will proceed in
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009. The Author
would like to thank: Dave Shaneyfelt of Wood Bender, LLP, for introducing him to the wide world of
insurance law, and for his unflagging support; Professor Leo Martinez, UC Hastings, for his guidance,
supervision, and assistance; Scott Hernandez for his wisdom and gravitas; and his family, for their love
and enthusiasm.
1. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494,506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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five Parts, ultimately arriving at a suggestion for a legislative reformation
of section 2860.
First, it will give a brief overview of the nature of the problem,
culminating in a consideration of San Diego Federal Credit Union v.
Cumis Insurance Society and its pre-section 2860 progeny. Next, the
Note will examine section 2860 and its status as a partial codification of
Cumis. The meager legislative history will be explored to demonstrate
the questionable and muddled intent of the legislature. Next, the series
of appellate decisions interpreting section 2860 will be examined to
highlight the tension between the reasoning of Cumis and the judicial
application of section 2860. The penultimate Part of the Note explores
solutions to that tension, ranging from the extremely proinsurance
carrier position of Washington, to the extremely proinsured position of
Alaska. Finally, a revision of section 2860 will be proposed. The revision
focuses on clearly defining "conflict of interest" within the statute. The
definition draws primarily from the California Rules of Professional
Conduct. It is the Author's belief that placing a clearer and more robust
definition of "conflict of interest" within the statute will better address
the problem first presented in Cumis.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CUMIS AND ITS PROGENY
A. THE PROBLEM
Most insurance contracts contain an agreement to defend the
insured from any suit brought against the insured Generally, the
insurance carrier selects the attorney to carry out this defense? However,
because these attorneys tend to derive large amounts of their business
from the insurance company, serious conflicts can arise.4 For instance,
insured's are often sued for a mix of claims, some of which are covered
by their policy, and others which are not. In this situation, the carrier-
appointed attorney may, consciously or not, craft the defense to free the
carrier from liability while leaving the insured solely responsible for the
defense of the noncovered claims.5
B. SAN DIEGO NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION V. CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY,
INC.
In the landmark case of San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v.
Cumis Insurance Society, Inc., the California Court of Appeal considered
the issue: "whether an insurer is required to pay for independent counsel
2. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to
Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. ioi, io6 (x997).
3. Id. at io7.
4. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (Alaska I993).
5. Id.
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for an insured when the insurer provides its own counsel but reserves its
right to assert noncoverage at a later date. 6 The court concluded that
such circumstances amounted to a conflict of interest, and thus held that
insurance carriers were required to provide independent counsel under
those conditions.7 "This holding was based on a long line of attorney-
client conflict of interest cases as well as the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility.
8
In Cumis, San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union and several other
defendants were sued seeking both compensatory and punitive damages.9
The defendants tendered the complaint to their liability insurer, Cumis.' °
Cumis accepted the defense, but reserved the right to disclaim coverage
if the defendants' conduct was found to be willful." It also disclaimed
coverage of any punitive damages.'" When the credit union received
notice that Cumis was reserving its rights, it retained independent
counsel to protect its interests.'3 Cumis, after initially agreeing to pay the
cost of independent counsel, subsequently refused. 4
Ultimately, the court held that Cumis was responsible for providing
independent counsel." In reaching its decision, the court first noted that
carrier-selected defense counsel have a dual-agency status, owing duties
to both the carrier and the insured. 6 The court next recognized that
when liability in an action turns on the conduct of the insured, some
characterizations of that conduct could result in noncoverage.'7 In that
situation, the carrier-appointed counsel will often be faced with decisions
that, regardless of his choice, will harm one of his clients and help the
other.'8
The Cumis court recognized this as a conflict of interest.'9 Where the
interests of the carrier and the insured conflict, "the [carrier] cannot
compel the insured to surrender control of the litigation."2 Therefore,
"[i]f the insurer must pay for the cost of defense and, when a conflict
exists, the insured may have control of the defense if he wishes, it follows
the insurer must pay for such defense conducted by independent
6. Cumis, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
7. Id. at 508.
8. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 257 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
9. 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
Io. Id.
iI. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 497.
15. Id. at 496.
6. Id. at 498.
17. Id.
i8. Id.
59. Id.
2o. Id. (quoting Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 394 P.2d 571, 577 (Cal. 1964)).
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counsel."2 Interestingly, the court rejected Cumis' argument that the
right to independent counsel should exist only when "actual" conflicts
arise (as opposed to "potential" conflicts). The court pragmatically
observed that "[r]ecognition of a conflict cannot wait until the moment a
tactical decision must be made during trial."22
Because the conduct of the credit union was at issue in the
underlying liability case in a way that could determine coverage, the
court held that Cumis was obligated to provide independent counsel for
the credit union. 3 After making this specific pronouncement, the court
went on to make the general statement that, lacking consent of all
parties, "where there are divergent interests of the insured and the
insurer brought about by the insurer's reservation of rights based on
possible noncoverage under the insurance policy, the insurer must pay
the reasonable cost for hiring independent counsel by the insured."24
While this broad language theoretically sanctioned use of independent
counsel in almost any reservation of rights situation, decisions
immediately following Cumis would soon limit the scope of the holding
while giving short shrift to the reasons underlying it.
C. POST-CUMIs CASES
The Cumis decision seemed to sanction the right to independent
counsel whenever the right to refuse coverage was reserved by a carrier.
The California Supreme Court implicitly approved of the Cumis decision
when it refused to grant review. 5 However, only a year after the Cumis
decision, the court in McGee v. Superior Court refused to find a right to
independent counsel for an insured whose carrier was defending an
action under a reservation of rights. 6
In McGee, the owner of a car (McGee) brought a negligence action
against its driver (Pedersen) for injuries she received as a passenger. 7
McGee's insurer agreed to defend Pedersen subject to a reservation of
rights based on the resident-relative exclusion in plaintiff's policy.
McGee, citing Cumis, moved to have the counsel assigned to Pederson
disqualified for a conflict of interest solely because the carrier had
reserved its rights." The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that no
conflict existed that would entitle Pedersen to independent counsel.29
21. Id. at 501-02.
22. Id. at 503 n.7.
23. Id. at 506.
24. Id.
25. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Super. Ct., 252 Cal. Rptr. 320, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
26. 221 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
27. Id. at 422.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 422-23.
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In reaching its decision, the court first pointed out that Pedersen
gave written, informed consent to the carrier-appointed representation,
thus waiving any rights to independent counsel." The court then
explained that the holding of the "rather wordy" Cumis opinion, while
stated broadly, was limited to the facts of that case.' That is, the
reservation of rights in Cumis was based on "the nature of the insured's
conduct, which as developed at trial would affect the determination as to
coverage."3
Accordingly, because Pedersen's carrier reserved its rights based on
the resident-relative exclusion of the insured's policy and not the
insured's conduct, the holding of Cumis did not control the case. More
succinctly, the coverage issue was "extrinsic to and independent of"
Pedersen's liability or conduct.33 Pedersen and the carrier's interest were
thus wholly aligned in finding nonliability in the tort action. Therefore,
although the carrier did reserve its rights, because the grounds for that
reservation were extrinsic to the issues in the third-party tort case, no
conflict of interest arose between the carrier and the insured.34
This general principle was further developed two years later, in
Native Sun Investment Group v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.35 In that case,
the court held that no conflict of interest exists when an insurer reserves
rights on the grounds of a coverage issue that is not the subject of the
underlying litigation. 6
In Native Sun, Ticor insured title to properties purchased by Native
Sun.37 The policy excluded from coverage any claims not shown by public
records." While Native Sun was planning development of the properties,
the State of California claimed an interest.39 Ticor agreed to defend
against any action by the State and indemnify Native Sun for any covered
loss, but "advised Native Sun that it would not indemnify them for any
loss occasioned by the State's enforcement of so-called Gion-Dietz
rights," which would fall under the public record exception of its policy.4"
After unsuccessful settlement attempts between the State and
Native Sun, Ticor agreed to prosecute a quiet-title action against the
State and selected counsel to do so.4' Native Sun agreed, but also
30, Id. at 423,
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 424.
34. Id.
35. 235 Cal. Rptr. 34,40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id
41. Id.
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retained independent counsel at its own expense. After a satisfactory
settlement of the quiet-title claim, Native Sun sued Ticor for
reimbursement of the fees it paid to independent counsel, relying on
Cumis.42
Upholding a lower court ruling that Ticor was not liable for
independent counsel fees, the Native Sun court held that "[c]ounsel
selected and paid by an insurer is not subject to a conflict which gives rise
to the right to independent counsel every time the insurer proposes to
provide a defense under a reservation of rights."43 Analogizing to McGee,
the court explained that the coverage issue was unrelated to the
underlying quiet-title action.' Specifically, whether the Gion-Dietz
claims were covered was a question of interpreting Ticor's policy
language.45 No such interpretation would occur in the quiet-title action.
Accordingly, no conflict of interest existed that would trigger an
entitlement to independent counsel. 46
The court did acknowledge the potential for the carrier-appointed
counsel to steer liability towards the uncovered claims and away from the
covered claims, possibly triggering a right to Cumis counsel.47 However,
the court declined to extend Cumis so far, especially because there was
no evidence in the record that the carrier-appointed counsel was
anything less than diligent in his litigation of all the issues in the quiet-
title claim."8 This is significant, because it seems to imply that unless a
conflict of interest actually arises, an insured may not be entitled to
reimbursement for independent counsel even if there is a potential
conflict. As noted in Part I, section B, this distinction between a potential
and an actual conflict was specifically rejected by the court in Cumis.49
In sum, while Cumis seemed to stand for the broad proposition that
any reservation of rights by an insurer creates a conflict that triggers an
entitlement to independent counsel, that holding was quickly restricted
by subsequent cases. The most important restriction being that
"[c]ounsel selected and paid by an insurer is not subject to a conflict
which gives rise to the right to independent counsel every time the
insurer proposes to provide a defense under a reservation of rights,"50
42. Id. at 39.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
5o. Native Sun, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
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especially when the issues determinative of coverage are "extrinsic to
and independent of" the issues in the underlying liability action.'
Later courts continued to follow McGee and Native Sun in limiting
the scope of Cumis.52 Four years after Cumis, the California legislature
entrenched many of the post-Cumis restrictions with the enactment of
California Civil Code section 286o. 53
II. CALIFORNIA CIVIL. CODE SECTION 2860
Some commentators have opined that the California legislature was
motivated by a desire to both codify the general principle of the Cumis
decision and increase the rights of carriers in a post-Cumis legal
landscape when it passed California Civil Code section 2860 in I987."a
However, the bill's history and the legislature's intent in its passage are
opaque at best and suspicious at worst.
The bill that eventually became section 2860 started its life as Senate
Bill 241, a bill to eliminate a sunset date in attorney certification in
medical malpractice cases.55 It would remain in such a state until just a
few days before its passage as the bill that ultimately became section'
2860.56 In fact, the only publicly available comment was the Senate
Judiciary Committee's report on the bill in its earlier, medical
malpractice form.57
While this bill made its usual rounds between the senate and the
assembly, a war was brewing between California trial attorneys and
insurance carriers. In 1986, a coalition of insurers and business owners
successfully passed Proposition 51 (now codified as California Civil Code
section 1431.2).58 Encouraged by the large margin with which the
proposition had passed, the same coalition readied another proposition
to further protect businesses and insurers from large tort judgments. 9 In
51. McGee v. Super. Ct., 221 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
52. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Wilks, 253 Cal. Rptr. 596, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
claims for punitive damages, without more, do not constitute a conflict of interest between the insured
and the carrier); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Hall, 245 Cal. Rptr. 99, 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that Cumis does not expand the obligation of a carrier to provide a defense where it would not
otherwise exist under its policy language).
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1993). The full text of the statute as currently in effect is
provided in an appendix to this Note. See infra Appendix I.
54. Jon R. Mower & James P. Schratz, The Other Side of the Cumis Coin: The Insurer's Ability to
Select Associate Defense Counsel Under Civil Code Section 286o(f), 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 569, 573-74
(1993).
55. CAL. DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, ENROLLED BILL REPORT: SB 241, at 3 (1987).
56. Id.
57. S. Judiciary Comm., Third Reading, Senate Bill File Analysis, S.B. 24, 1987-88 Reg. Sess (Cal.
1987).
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2007); see Donald F. Miles, The Brown-Lockyer Civil Liability
Reform Act of1987, 9 CEB Civ. LmG. REP. 257, 257 (1987).
59. Miles, supra note 58.
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response, the California Trial Lawyers Association readied an opposing
proposition that would demand extensive regulation of the insurance
industry.6' Both sides, however, soon realized the enormous costs of
waging such a "proposition war," and agreed to meet and discuss their
disagreements.
After months of negotiation, and with the blessings of the legislative
and executive branch (but no public comment or disclosure), the two
groups put together and submitted a legislative package, "The Brown-
Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987. ''62 The package addressed
four substantive issues, one of which was "procedures governing so
called Cumis counsel., 6, In a matter of days, Senate Bill 241 was gutted,
and the language drafted by the insurance companies was inserted in its
place. These "amendments" were passed by the assembly and senate,
and quickly sent to the governor for signing.4 Only the Department of
Consumer Affairs was able to offer any opposition to this backroom deal
in the form of a short report attached to the governor's report on the
bill.6' The report pointed out that no consumer groups had been able to
see the bill or debate its merits, and that no other interested parties had
been allowed to offer comment.66 It questioned whether consumers were
actually protected by the bill and whether it truly represented their
interests. Senator Lockyer protested this characterization in a letter
attached to the same report, but offered little in the way of substantive
evidence to the contrary.
Whatever the merits of that particular debate, this history of Senate
Bill 241 shows that section 2860 is far from a careful, legislative
consideration of what the court thought in Cumis. It muddies what was a
fairly bright-line rule offered by the court in Cumis, and in so doing, it
opens numerous ethical traps for California's attorneys.
While the effects of section 2860 on subsequent court decisions will
be discussed more fully in Part III of this Note, it is helpful to note the
differences between section 2860 and the Cumis decision. Most
significantly, this section seems to approve of the implication in Native
Sun that a conflict must be actual to trigger Cumis obligations.6 It also
codifies the Wilks holding that punitive damages or claims in excess of
60. Id.
6i. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 1987 CAL. SENATE J. 3594; see also 1987 CAL. SENATE J. 4068.
65. CAL. DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 55.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Letter from Bill Lockyer, Senator, State of California, to George Deukmejian, Governor,
State of California (Sept. i6, 1987) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(a) (West 1993).
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the policy limit do not, in themselves, create a conflict of interest." This is
particularly odd, given how the possibility of punitive damages figured
directly into the reasoning of the Cumis court.7
Further, the statute envisions both the independent counsel and a
carrier-appointed counsel cooperating on each case.72 While the
permissible extent of the carrier-appointed counsel's involvement is
unclear, prior to the enactment of section 2860 the carrier-appointed
counsel typically had no interaction with independent counsel.73 Finally,
section 2860 allows the carrier to demand certain qualifications from the
independent counsel as well as capping the rates that counsel may charge
at "rates which are actually paid [by the carrier] in the ordinary course of
business.""
III. DUTIES OF INSURER AND INSURED AFTER SECTION 2860
As explained above, section 286o asserts the right of insureds to
demand independent counsel from their insurance carriers when a
conflict of interest arises, while also outlining the scope of some
qualifying conflicts.75 The code also grants certain rights to carriers,
allowing them to demand a minimum amount of experience from the
counsel their insureds select and governing the rate independent counsel
may charge. 6 Further, it requires independent counsel to disclose to the
insurer all nonprivileged information about the action in a timely
fashion.77 Finally, without abrogating any existing contractual duties to
cooperate, the statute gives the carrier a right to have carrier-selected
counsel "participate in all aspects of the litigation.""5 How California
courts have applied and enforced these rights and duties is the subject of
this Part.
A. APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
Since the enactment of section 2860, courts have been fond of stating
that the section "does not preclude judicial determination of conflict of
interest and duty to provide independent counsel such as was
accomplished in Cumis so long as that determination is consistent with
70. CAL. CIv. CODE § 286o(b).
71. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503-04 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that punitive damages implicate the willfulness of the insured's conduct,
and thus directly relate to an issue determinative of coverage).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(0.
73. Mower & Schratz, supra note 54, at 576-77.
74. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860(c).
75. Id. §§ 286o(a)-(b).
76. Id. § 286o(c).
77. Id. § 286o(d).
78. Id. § 286o(0.
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the section."79 Despite this acknowledgement, courts, with a few
exceptions, construed the Cumis doctrine narrowly and failed to find a
right to Cumis counsel in most cases that have reached the appellate
level.
i. Triggering Conditions
Generally, any time an attorney who represents both the carrier and
its insured finds "his or her representation of the one is rendered less
effective by reason of his [or her] representation of the other,"8 a conflict
of interest sufficient to require independent counsel may be present. The
"paradigm case" requiring independent counsel is where the defense
strategy of counsel retained by the insurance carrier can affect an
underlying coverage dispute between the carrier and its insured.8 ,
Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. The Housing Group, provides an example.8'
In Scottsdale, a developer's insurance policies provided for
significantly less coverage when earth movement caused property
damage on the developer's property.83 When the developer tendered a
construction defect suit against it to its insurance carrier, the carrier
accepted the defense but reserved its right to reduce coverage for
damage caused by earth movement.8 ' The developer then retained
independent counsel, and the carrier sued for a declaration that it was
not liable to provide such counsel .
In granting summary judgment to the insured, the court reasoned
that:
[T]he factual position favorable to [the carrier] is the precise opposite
of the one favorable to [the insured, and] ... the coverage issues "turn
on" facts which will be developed in [the construction defect] action.
For this reason, requiring [the insured] to rely .. . on the pretrial fact
gathering and case preparation of attorneys whose clients' interests are
served by the establishment of facts detrimental to [the insured's]
coverage case clearly runs counter to the principle set out in Cumis and
Golden Eagle.6
Courts have recognized several other situations that trigger a right to
independent counsel."7 Some imply such obvious violations of an
79. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Super. Ct., 252 Cal. Rptr. 320, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. t988): see also
Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Assocs., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted);
Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 257-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citation
omitted).
8o. See James 3 Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., i ii Cal. Rptr. 2d i8i, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see also
Gafcon, i2o Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418.
81. Golden Eagle, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
82. No. C 94-3864 TEH, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8791, *16 (N.D. Cal. June 2I, 1995).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *16-17 (footnote omitted).
87. See James 3 Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., i i i Cal. Rptr. 2d 18I, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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attorney's ethical duty that they are rarely litigated.88 Other cases, more
recently litigated, involve conflicts that may not be as apparent.
One such instance is where the insurance carrier pursues a
settlement in excess of policy limits, leaving the insured exposed to
further liability."' In Golden Eagle, an insurance carrier negotiated the
settlement of a claim far in excess of the policy limits of its insureds.'
The insureds retained independent counsel to protect their interests in
the settlement agreement. The carrier refused to pay for independent
counsel and, when the insureds objected to the settlement because it
exposed them to further liability, the carrier petitioned the court to
approve the settlement over the insured's objections. The carrier-
appointed attorney initially recommended the settlement and then failed
to oppose it, despite his knowledge that the insureds did not approve.
In awarding the costs of independent counsel to the insureds, the
court stated that: "Not only was [carrier-appointed] counsel put in the
position of representing clients with conflicting positions regarding
settlement, one set of clients-the insurers-was seeking to settle the
case with the other clients' money. Under these circumstances, we hold
the [insureds] were entitled to independent counsel...."'
One of the more recent cases to deal extensively with other
circumstances that trigger a right to independent counsel is Gafcon, Inc.
v. Ponsor & Associates." While Gafcon concerned motions for summary
disposition and thus did not directly reach the issue of independent
counsel,93 the court's comments are helpful in understanding the current
state of the law.
In Gafcon, the insured's (Gafcon) insurance carrier accepted
defense of a negligent construction suit under a reservation of rights.'
Gafcon sought declaratory relief that a conflict of interest existed
sufficient to trigger a right to independent counsel.95 The trial court
granted summary judgment in Gafcon' favor.96
In reversing that holding and declaring that its carrier-appointed
counsel was not operating under a conflict of interest, the Court of
Appeal outlined what a carrier must show to win a summary judgment.97
88. See, e.g., O'Morrow v. Borad, 167 P.2d 483, 486 (Cal. 1946) (explaining that an insurance
carrier could not represent both plaintiff and defendant in a single action because a full and fair
examination of the merits of the case could not occur).
89. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co.. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
90. Id.
9i. Id.
92. 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. ld. at 398-99.
96. Id. at 399.
97. Id. at 419 .
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First, it must be able to prove both that the carrier-appointed counsel
could not control coverage issues and that the carrier-appointed
counsel's representation of the insured would not be rendered less
effective because of its relationship with the carrier." The court
suggested that some showing of how "the issues presented by [the
carrier's] reservation of rights differed from or were extrinsic to" the
issues in the third-party litigation, would at least help to meet this
burden.'
In its explanation, the court succinctly presented the two most likely
signs that a Cumis triggering conflict has arisen. First, that the carrier-
appointed counsel could control coverage issues by his actions in the
underlying suit, and second, that his representation of one client was
rendered less effective by his representation of the other." Finally, the
court reiterated the holding of several post-Cumis, pre-section 2860
cases that when the carrier's reservation of rights is based on an issue
extrinsic to the subject of the underlying litigation, no conflict exists."'
2. Grounds for Appointment Lacking
While these post-section 2860 cases allow for appointment of Cumis
counsel, they are not the majority. As at least one commentator has
pointed out, courts have been reluctant to find grounds for Cumis
counsel in the post-section 2860 landscape.
0 2
One of the first post-section 2860 cases to find a lack of a Cumis
conflict was Blanchard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."3 In Blanchard,
a general contractor tendered defense of a construction defect suit to his
insurance carrier. 4 The carrier accepted the defense, but reserved its
rights with respect to coverage for certain damages."'5 In a suit by the
insured, alleging bad faith on the part of the carrier for failing to provide
independent counsel, the court refused to acknowledge that this sort of
reservation created a conflict of interest sufficient to trigger the duty to
provide independent counsel."
Reiterating the holding of McGee, the court stated "[a] conflict of
interest does not arise unless the outcome of the coverage issue can be
controlled by [carrier-appointed] counsel.""''° Because the coverage issue
98. Id.
99. Id.
too. Id.
to. Id.
102. Christopher R. Wagner, Making Reservations: Courts Are Reluctant to Find a Conflict of
Interest Based on the Presumed Malfeasance of Insurance Defense Counsel, L.A. LAWYER, June 2003, at
37-
103. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
104. Id. at 885.
Io5. Id.
io6. Id. at 886.
io7. Id. at 887.
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involved only damages and not the conduct of the insured, the carrier-
appointed counsel had no motivation to attach liability to the insured;
both the carrier and the insured were aligned in their goal to minimize
liability."" Further, the insured produced no evidence showing any
specific manner in which the carrier-appointed counsel could have
influenced the case to the insured's detriment."° The court characterized
the insured's position as urging that "an unspecified possibility of a
conflict" was sufficient to trigger the duty to provide independent
counsel."' The court rejected this position because the insured offered no
facts that indicated any conflict."' Because no facts were in dispute, and
the existence of a conflict is a question of law, the insurance carrier was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."2
The case of Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange
also spoke about conditions that would not be sufficient to trigger a duty
to provide independent counsel."3 In Dynamic Concepts, the insured
tendered a lengthy complaint to its carrier. The complaint listed
numerous causes of action,"4 only one of which was even potentially
covered by the insured's policy with its carrier. When the carrier
accepted the defense under a reservation of rights, the insured insisted
that the reservation necessarily triggered a Cumis duty and demanded
that the carrier withdraw its reservation of rights."5 One of the rights
being reserved was the right to be reimbursed for defense costs for any
claims that were not covered by the policy."6 Even though the carrier
allowed the insured's independent counsel to control the defense, it did
not withdraw its reservation and attempted to have carrier-appointed
counsel associate in the action."' The carrier also appointed an attorney
to investigate any Cumis issues that might be involved in the case."
However, the insured refused to acknowledge or communicate with
carrier-appointed counsel, and proceeded to settle all the claims without
informing the carrier.' The insured subsequently sued the carrier,
alleging bad faith in that it had failed to acknowledge its duty to provide
io8. Id.
lO9. Id.
io. Id.
iii. Id.
112. Id.
113. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882,889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
114. Id. at 884.
115. Id.
ii6. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
1i9. Id. at 885.
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Cumis counsel.'20 The insured demanded reimbursement for the entire
settlement amount.'
2
'
In refusing to award the insured the damages it requested, the court
made several observations about what factors trigger a duty to provide
independent counsel. First, "not every reservation of rights entitles an
insured to select Cumis counsel ..... Furthermore, "[a] mere possibility of
an unspecified conflict does not require independent counsel. The
conflict must be significant, not merely theoretical, actual, not merely
potential.' 23 The court noted that the language of section 2860
"specifically provides that 'a conflict of interest does not exist as to
allegations or facts in the litigation for which the insurer denies
coverage."'24 It further uses the permissive "conflict of interest may
exist," rather than the mandatory "shall.'
25
Because of this, the court rejected the insured's contention that
either a "global reservation of rights" or a reservation of the right to
reimbursement for uncovered claims always triggers a duty to provide
independent counsel.12 6 The court offered the following guidelines for
determining when such a duty arises: "the potential for conflict requires a
careful analysis of the parties respective interest to determine whether
they can be reconciled (such as by a defense based on total nonliability)
or whether an actual conflict of interest precludes insurer-appointed
defense counsel from presenting a quality defense for the insured."'2 7 The
court also noted that any potential conflict of interest could be obviated
so long as carrier-appointed counsel actually litigated diligently on the
insured's behalf.'2 8 The court also rejected the assumption that simply
because an attorney is appointed by an insurance carrier he will attempt
to manipulate any litigation against the insured.'29 While these comments,
which seem to heighten the requirements for appointment of Cumis
counsel, have been disputed,'30 they continue to be cited with approval in
later decisions. 31
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 887.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 286o(b) (West 1993)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 888.
129. Id.
130. See Kurt L. Schmalz, Deconstructing Cumis: Recent Appellate Court Decisions Limiting the
Use of Cumis Counsel Have Created a Conflict Between the Law and the Rules of Professional
Conduct, L.A. LAWYER, Mar. 1999, at 48.
131. See James 3 Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 11i Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, I9o-i (Cal. Ct. App. 2oo).
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Generally then, courts have been hesitant to find a duty to provide
independent counsel without an actual conflict concerning a coverage
issue that could be determined in the underlying third-party litigation. A
key to determining whether such a conflict exists is establishing whether
"the retained attorney in fact was ... subject to the conflicting forces
which gave rise to Cumis.'.32 Stated differently: "the test is whether the
conflict 'precludes the insurer-appointed defense counsel from
presenting a quality defense for the insured." '33 If the conflict does not
prevent counsel from providing a diligent and complete defense, then
there is no need for Cumis counsel. While this may be a fair reading of
section 2860, it turns a blind eye to the issues addressed in Cumis as well
as the California Rules of Professional Conduct.
IV. OTHER STATES' SOLUTIONS
California is not the only state to have dealt with the pitfalls that
insurer-appointed attorneys face. While there are almost as many
approaches as there are states, they generally fall between two extremes,
best represented by Alaska on the one end and Washington on the other.
Alaska, by judicial decision that was later codified, allows for insureds to
select their own attorney whenever the carrier reserves its rights,
regardless of the reasons for the carrier's reservation.'34 While certainly
reassuring to insureds, this approach has at least one problem of its own.
An insurance carrier may reserve its rights for perfectly legitimate
reasons that can not possibly give rise to a conflict of interest for the
carrier-appointed attorney.'35 Making a carrier pay for a second attorney
in every one of these situations will likely increase the cost of doing
business, resulting in higher premiums and removing liability insurance
from some consumers' reach.
Washington, on the other hand, entrusts all conflict problems to the
integrity of the attorney, giving the insured no right to select independent
counsel.', 6 If the carrier-appointed attorney sees a conflict, he is obligated
to withdraw; if he sees no conflict, he may proceed.'37 Furthermore, states
132. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d
534, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Native Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 34,
40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)).
133. Id. (quoting WALTER CROSKEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: INSURANCE LITIGATION
§ 7:772 (1999)).
134. ALASKA STAT. § 2 1.89.00 (2007); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844
P.2d 1113, 11 i19 (Alaska 1993).
135. For instance, if there is some question about whether or not the insured is up to date on his or
her premium payments.
136. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 715 P.2d 1133, 1140 (Wash. 1986).
137. Id. at 1138.
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adopting this position note that if the carrier-appointed attorney wrongs
an insured, the insured may always sue the attorney.'
This approach is flawed for two reasons. First, when an attorney
derives a large portion of his income from insurance carriers it is a
dubious proposition that he can always put that fact aside while
representing an insured.'39 Second, leaving pursuit of the remedy to the
insured, and even then only after injury has occurred, amounts to little
deterrence. Many insureds are unsophisticated, and if they have just lost
a serious tort suit due to the malpractice of the carrier-appointed
attorney they may not have the resources (or indeed the patience or
nerve) to return to court in pursuit of the attorney.'40
V. RECONSTRUCTING CUMIS
Both of the above approaches seem to give either too little or to
much to the insured. The Washington approach leaves the insured at the
mercy of an attorney who may or may not be ethical in his choices. The
Alaska approach forces insurance carriers to bear increased costs in
order to prevent a harm that may have little to no chance of occurring.
California appellate courts have slowly crept more towards the direction
of Washington, in a fairly consistent move to limit the scope of what
qualifies an insured to select independent counsel. A careful reading of
the opinions reveals that California courts have not settled on one
definition of "conflict," and this lack of consistency is largely responsible
for the judicial narrowing of the protections first established in Cumis
and to some extent codified in section 2860. To remedy this situation, the
legislature should add language to the beginning of section 2860, clearly
defining the type of conflict necessary for triggering the right to
independent counsel.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit
representing a client when a conflict of interest exists and define a
conflict as a situation where:
(i) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer. '
138. See, e.g., id.
139. CHI of Alaska, 844 P.2d at 1117.
140. Cf. Johnson v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 788 P.2d 598,599 (Wash. Ct. App. 199o).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2oo8).
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The California Rules similarly provide:
A member shall not, without the informed written consent of each
client:
(i) Accept representation of more than one client in a matter in
which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or
(2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a
matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict'42
This language, including both potential and actual conflicts, could be
integrated into the new definitions for section 2860 either outright or
with some slight editing. While some commentators see this move as
conflating ethics and substantive insurance law,'43 others recognize that
the statute inherently pits insurance law and legal ethics against each
other.'" More importantly, the California courts themselves have
recognized that this issue is inherently an ethical one that happens to
arise in the area of insurance law.'45 Accordingly, this modest definitional
amendment will give insureds maximum protection from the myriad of
conflicts that arise in the context of insurance defense, while keeping the
expenditure of the insurance carriers limited to those situations where
there is an actual risk of harm to the insureds. Furthermore, it will
further the always admirable goal of increasing public confidence in the
bar.
CONCLUSION
Because of the meager and suspicious history of California Civil
Code section 2860, the difficulty courts have had in applying it in the very
situations it was allegedly intended to remedy, and the deficiencies of the
approaches of other states, the California legislature needs to spend time
seriously considering the intersection of the rules of professional conduct
and substantive insurance laws. By clearly defining "conflict" in a revised
section 2860 the legislature can streamline application in the courts and
do more to protect unsophisticated insureds from conflicted attorneys
and adversarial insurance providers.
142. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT3-3IO(c) (2008).
143. Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers' Professional Responsibilities: Part II-
Contested Coverage Cases, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 29,36-37 (2001).
144. Schmalz, supra note 13o, at 87.
145. See, e.g., James 3 Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., iii Cal. Rptr. 2d i8S, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
("'The governing principle underlying Cumis and section 2860 is the attorney's ethical duty to the
clients."' (quoting Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 257 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993))).
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APPENDIX I: CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 2860
(a) If the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty to
defend upon an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a
duty on the part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the
insured, the insurer shall provide independent counsel to represent the
insured unless, at the time the insured is informed that a possible conflict
may arise or does exist, the insured expressly waives, in writing, the right
to independent counsel. An insurance contract may contain a provision
which sets forth the method of selecting that counsel consistent with this
section.
(b) For purposes of this section, a conflict of interest does not
exist as to allegations or facts in the litigation for which the insurer
denies coverage; however, when an insurer reserves its rights on a given
issue and the outcome of that coverage issue can be controlled by
counsel first retained by the insurer for the defense of the claim, a
conflict of interest may exist. No conflict of interest shall be deemed to
exist as to allegations of punitive damages or be deemed to exist solely
because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of the insurance
policy limits.
(c) When the insured has selected independent counsel to
represent him or her, the insurer may exercise its right to require that the
counsel selected by the insured possess certain minimum qualifications
which may include that the selected counsel have (i) at least five years of
civil litigation practice which includes substantial defense experience in
the subject at issue in the litigation, and (2) errors and omissions
coverage. The insurer's obligation to pay fees to the independent counsel
selected by the insured is limited to the rates which are actually paid by
the insurer to attorneys retained by it in the ordinary course of business
in the defense of similar actions in the community where the claim arose
or is being defended. This subdivision does not invalidate other different
or additional policy provisions pertaining to attorney's fees or providing
for methods of settlement of disputes concerning those fees. Any dispute
concerning attorney's fees not resolved by these methods shall be
resolved by final and binding arbitration by a single neutral arbitrator
selected by the parties to the dispute.
(d) When independent counsel has been selected by the insured,
it shall be the duty of that counsel and the insured to disclose to the
insurer all information concerning the action except privileged materials
relevant to coverage disputes, and timely to inform and consult with the
insurer on all matters relating to the action. Any claim of privilege
asserted is subject to in camera review in the appropriate law and motion
department of the superior court. Any information disclosed by the
[Vol. 6o:88I
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insured or by independent counsel is not a waiver of the privilege as to
any other party.
(e) The insured may waive its right to select independent
counsel by signing the following statement: "I have been advised and
informed of my right to select independent counsel to represent me in
this lawsuit. I have considered this matter fully and freely waive my right
to select independent counsel at this time. I authorize my insurer to
select a defense attorney to represent me in this lawsuit."
(f) Where the insured selects independent counsel pursuant to
the provisions of this section, both the counsel provided by the insurer
and independent counsel selected by the insured shall be allowed to
participate in all aspects of the litigation. Counsel shall cooperate fully in
the exchange of information that is consistent with each counsel's ethical
and legal obligation to the insured. Nothing in this section shall relieve
the insured of his or her duty to cooperate with the insurer under the
terms of the insurance contract.
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